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Episode 6: A Silent Injury

The Sound: Mystery of Havana Syndrome   27 Feb 2023   35 min   4,790 words

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Marc Polymeropoulos (00:00):
Guys, I get my bandwidth. I'm not feeling great today. So let's—

Nicky Woolf (00:02):
Yeah, I say if you want, you can sit down. You guys want to catch up? We're in Virginia Beach, about a 4-hour drive from Washington, D.C., to meet a man who's become a key character in this story. His name is Marc Polymeropoulos. He's one of the most vocal advocates for victims of what the government is now officially calling anomalous health incidents. But before this chapter of his life began, Marc was a high-flying CIA officer. He spent 26 years at the agency, 12 of them in the field. He was an operations officer.

Marc Polymeropoulos (00:37):
Which meant I was, you know, responsible for spotting, assessing, developing, recruiting, and handling, you know, agents, spies,

Nicky Woolf (00:45):
Marc was ambitious, a rising star at the CIA. After 9/11, he was put in charge of counterterrorism operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Marc Polymeropoulos (00:54):
After the 2016 elections, the agency leadership took a lot of us and put us on, frankly, Russia, because it was time to push back.

Nicky Woolf (01:01):
By 2016, though, Russia's increasing aggression had become impossible to ignore.

News clip (01:07):
Russian troops spreading out throughout the strategic Crimean Peninsula. International investigators have concluded that Russian President Vladimir Putin played an active role —officials have told CBS News that American intelligence agencies believe Putin at some point was directly involved in the hacking around the election.

Nicky Woolf (01:27):
So with US-Russia relations in their steepest decline since the fall of the Berlin Wall, the CIA was told to take the gloves off. Marc was promoted to chief of clandestine operations over Europe and Eurasia. And in December 2017, he made his first official trip to Moscow.

Marc Polymeropoulos (01:46):
And, you know, something happened there that certainly changed my life.

Archive audio (01:50):
Gavarit, ibogazovet Moskva.

Nicky Woolf (01:54):
From Project Brazen and PRX, this is The Sound. I'm Nicky Woolf. Chapter 6: A Silent Injury.

Max Johnston (02:14):
Check, check, one, two.

Nicky Woolf (02:17):
We are out in front of the Spy Museum in Washington, D.C., and there's like a big sign that says Spy Museum, and on the thing in front of it, there's a do not climb sign, and it says, "We are watching," which I think is really cool.

Max Johnston (02:31):
All right, let's head inside.

Nicky Woolf (02:35):
I'm here with Max, my producer. We've been on this wild journey of a story together from the very beginning. The Spy Museum recently moved into a brand new building, and the tall glass atrium is bright and filled with cool stuff. We loiter for a while by James Bond's Aston Martin. Is that the actual one from the film, do you think?

Max Johnston (02:57):
Yeah. Goldfinger.

Nicky Woolf (03:00):
We've come here to see one item in particular. A device ominously called "The Thing." I know, I know, Havana Syndrome was called "The Thing" at the beginning too. Not to beat a dead horse, but come on guys, we really need to find some new names for this stuff. Aliza Bran, the museum's media relations manager, finds us in the lobby and whisks us past the ticket kiosk and up in the staff elevator.

Aliza Bran (03:23):
"Alright, so here's where the whole adventure begins." And I'm just going to take you right over to the thing.

Max Johnston (03:32):
Please, yeah.

Nicky Woolf (03:34):
Here's what we're seeing. Behind the glass is a circle of chunky, beautifully carved mahogany. It's a couple feet across and has the presidential seal of the United States on it. You know the design: a bald eagle, wings proudly outstretched, surrounded by stars, clutching a bundle of arrows in one claw and an olive branch in another. The thing, though, is what's inside its beak. In 1945, the Great Seal sculpture was presented to the American ambassador in Moscow by a group of Soviet schoolchildren. He was so honored, he put it on the wall of his personal study, right behind his desk. That, it turns out, was not the smartest thing to do.

Aliza Bran (04:24):
And in fact, it's supposed to be interesting enough that one may want to put it up in their office so that it can collect this intelligence.

Nicky Woolf (04:33):
As you've probably guessed by now, the Great Seal, it was bugged. Inside the eagle's beak is a tiny transmitter, maybe the size of an AA battery.

Max Johnston (04:43):
When was the device discovered?

Aliza Bran (04:46):
I think it was 1952 it was discovered, and it took several months for them to figure out how it even worked.

Nicky Woolf (04:51):
It hung undetected in the US ambassador's study for 7 years.

Aliza Bran (04:57):
I believe it was the British who were making that determination.

Max Johnston (05:02):
And so all meat is cyclophobic. Yeah, it is kind of interesting.

Nicky Woolf (05:06):
Discovered by the British. Hell yeah.

Aliza Bran (05:08):
From a scientific standpoint, it is kind of cool. Ultimately, they were like, how does this— how is this working? How does it happen?

Nicky Woolf (05:16):
Up till then, bugs needed a power source. This was different.

Aliza Bran (05:21):
The thing was a passive cavity resonator activated by a radio beam from a van outside. When people spoke, sound waves entered through tiny holes under the eagle's beak. These vibrated a membrane that modulated the radio beam, bouncing it back as an audio signal to the people listening in the van.

Nicky Woolf (05:40):
It was powered from the outside. By RF energy. All the Russians needed to do was bathe the building in microwave radiation and record the signal that came back. Activated by a radio beam. Because obviously we're looking into the idea that Havana Syndrome might be in a similar way, like a beam, a microwave beam from outside.

Aliza Bran (06:01):
Sure.

Nicky Woolf (06:02):
That's why coming here and seeing this is so cool, because it's, you know, this is 1945 they were doing this, right? Like There's been decades and decades of development on this sort of thing. The museum is filled with examples of how the US and Soviet Union were constantly prodding each other. We've focused on the idea that what hit the victims in Havana could have been the deliberate deployment of a weapon. But the Great Seal Thing implies another possibility. Which, — But— you know, the culture of this kind of spycraft, right?

Aliza Bran (06:43):
And how you use things. So we talk about how you can create physical damage on the other end. So sometimes, you know, there are additional consequences to whether it's, you know, radio or whatever wave or connectivity or technology you're using. You can really do additional damage and sometimes intentional. Sometimes not.

Nicky Woolf (07:05):
The technological principles are the same. It's all about that intention. That's one of the major theories as to the— it's a surveillance device that then they discovered might be doing damage, and then whether they then— Now we have to do some digging. We want to know how the technology has evolved since then and how the intentions may have changed too. Guys, thank you so much. It was such a pleasure meeting you. This was fabulous. Yeah. Yes. Yeah. How do we watch the—

Aliza Bran (07:35):
Great questions. You can either take the elevator or the stairs. Either way, it deposits you like any good museum right near gift shop. So yeah.

Nicky Woolf (07:51):
The discovery of the microwave-activated listening device in the Great Seal was just the start. The Soviets used radiation in all sorts of intelligence gathering. It eventually even got a name. Moscow Signal.

Peter Kornbluh (08:06):
The Moscow Signal was almost 30 years of radiation beams directed at the upper floors of the US Embassy Chancellery building in Moscow.

Nicky Woolf (08:23):
This is Peter Kornbluh, a journalist and founder of the National Security Archive. In 2022, he published a stunning series of newly declassified documents relating to the American response to the Moscow signal.

Peter Kornbluh (08:36):
In the early 1950s, an energy signal was detected by radio operators.

Nicky Woolf (08:46):
This signal was first detected around the same time as the Great Seal, and the Americans found more devices around the embassy.

Peter Kornbluh (08:54):
But 10 years went by before the State Department decided they would actually try and focus on what this was and identify its purpose and where it came from and its strength.

Nicky Woolf (09:05):
Finally, in 1962, State sent a team to measure the energy coming into the embassy. They identified it—

Peter Kornbluh (09:13):
Microwave radiation beams that were directed at the embassy for 9, 10 hours a day. The first test conducted by the CIA showed a shockingly high radiation level, and it was at that point when the United States realized there, you know, was something going on.

Nicky Woolf (09:32):
In a panic, the US government sprung into action. The Pentagon commissioned a top-secret, multimillion-dollar investigation named Project Pandora. They wanted to know if these microwaves were part of some sort of attack and if they could be dangerous. So they set about testing the effect of this level of radiation on monkeys. The whole thing was largely a farce. Farce. The experiment design was dire, according to a classified review by the RAND Corporation. Several of the chimpanzees were accidentally strangled by their own restraints, the review actually noted, concluding that the study had come up with, quote, "no material which is scientifically credible." As if that wasn't enough, the CIA miscalculated the strength of the signal. Whoever took the original measurements had miscalibrated their equipment. The actual radiation level was considerably lower than they'd thought. After 4 embarrassingly unproductive years, the investigations were shut down without coming to anything approaching a conclusive finding. We're still in the dark.

Peter Kornbluh (10:40):
Even today, all these years and decades later, we don't have the CIA or NSA records that state categorically what the purpose of the microwave radiation was.

Nicky Woolf (10:57):
In Washington, stung by the failure to find any proof of deleterious effects, the fact that the Soviets were microwaving their embassy remained a low priority.

Peter Kornbluh (11:07):
The beams continued well into the 1970s and even 1980s.

Nicky Woolf (11:14):
And while, sure, the radiation wasn't as shockingly strong as that first CIA reading claimed, the problem was getting worse.

Peter Kornbluh (11:22):
By the early '70s, the signal went from being one signal to being multiple signals. The signal was, multiplied. It was stronger, and it was being beamed at the embassy for more hours a day, sometimes up to 15, 19 hours a day.

James Schumaker (11:50):
My name is James Schumaker. I am a retired Foreign Service officer. In 1977, I was assigned to our embassy in Moscow, and I served there for 2 years.

Nicky Woolf (12:05):
And before you went, had you heard anything about Moscow Signal?

James Schumaker (12:09):
No, absolutely nothing.

Nicky Woolf (12:14):
When James Schumaker got to Moscow in 1977, the story had been in the public domain for almost a year. The actual American staff on the ground in Moscow had been kept in the dark about what was going on until 1976.

James Schumaker (12:28):
When Ambassador Stoessel briefed embassy personnel on the existence of the microwave issue, at that time, that was a year before I arrived.

Nicky Woolf (12:37):
The discovery of the Great Seal hadn't deterred the Kremlin even a little. In fact, by the time James arrived, all this surveillance had expanded dramatically.

James Schumaker (12:45):
So ever since we were there, microwaves were being beamed at us. And so you would hear kind of the gossip about what was the latest with the microwaves issue. But quite frankly, beyond the press briefings that the State Department gave people, very few people were aware of the facts.

Nicky Woolf (13:04):
For James, the microwave thing wasn't top of the list of his worries.

James Schumaker (13:09):
I've always been kind of dumb but happy in a way. I have a tendency not to start at shadows, even when the shadows are real.

Nicky Woolf (13:19):
He knew he was being surveilled and followed by Russian agents anyway. Everyone was. Houses would be broken into. Airline baggage would arrive late, having been rifled through.

James Schumaker (13:29):
It was a very peripheral concern. You know, I just focus on my job.

Nicky Woolf (13:34):
But among his colleagues, there was growing anger.

James Schumaker (13:38):
A lot of Americans at POST were very upset at having now found out that microwaves had been beamed at the embassy.

Nicky Woolf (13:49):
The government was insisting there was no need for concern. But people were starting to question that narrative. On an anecdotal level, they were seeing things that troubled them. Llewellyn Thompson, a recent former ambassador, died in 1972 of pancreatic cancer. Two years later, so did his predecessor, Charles Bohlen. Both were in their 60s. Walter Stoessel, the ambassador just before James's arrival, developed a rare form of leukemia seemingly out of the blue. He was in his mid-50s.

James Schumaker (14:22):
You know, all these things started started coming together, and I didn't really know what to do about it. You know, I was just becoming more gradually aware that there was a problem.

Nicky Woolf (14:35):
Of course, these can be explained as coincidences, but they're pretty big coincidences, and they were piling up. Alarmed, a number of James's colleagues filed lawsuits against the government. He wasn't one of them.

James Schumaker (14:49):
And I didn't really start getting concerned about the whole microwave issue in any way until after I had left post.

Nicky Woolf (15:02):
In response to the lawsuits and press coverage, State commissioned a study by Johns Hopkins. Published in 1978, it reported no measurable evidence of harm, which led to all of the lawsuits being dropped. But in the decades since, Many have poked holes in this study. Its authors have admitted that they were rushed to publish. They only surveyed former staffers for a few years, so long-term impacts weren't measured. And the data collection was imprecise. For many test subjects, it was unclear where they worked in the embassy and for how long. So it was impossible to tell what their level of exposure could have been. The coincidences were becoming increasingly difficult to explain away. James left in 1979 after a 2-year tour.

James Schumaker (15:51):
And I went through my end-of-tour medical exam at the State Department, and they said, "Well, you know, your blood count is abnormal."

Nicky Woolf (16:00):
The doctors told James he had a very high white blood cell count. It was alarming, but they told him, probably not deadly or anything like that. No reason to panic. What was actually considerably more alarming was when they told him they weren't surprised.

James Schumaker (16:20):
So they said, "Look, it's nothing to worry about. This happens to a lot of people who come out of Moscow. So just go to a hematologist once a year to get new blood tests. And, you know, let us know if something other than that happens."

Max Johnston (16:38):
Actually, sorry, sorry, Nikki, I just had a really quick follow-up on that.

Nicky Woolf (16:43):
This actually sailed straight over my head in the moment, but Max followed up.

Max Johnston (16:47):
When, when you went to the doctors the first time and they noticed your elevated, I believe, white blood cell count, they mentioned that other people in Moscow had experienced something similar?

James Schumaker (16:57):
Yeah, this is something that was generally known, but nobody quite knew the reason why. They said it was just sort of standard operating procedure.

Nicky Woolf (17:06):
About 1 in 3 people returning from Embassy Moscow, the doctors said, had severely elevated white blood cell counts like this. 1 in 3. Over the next few years, James has kept climbing.

James Schumaker (17:27):
And then in 1985, I was diagnosed with chronic lymphocytic leukemia.

Nicky Woolf (17:33):
That's the same cancer Ambassador Stoessel had developed.

James Schumaker (17:37):
It was stage 0, so no treatment was required. And in fact, I was having no symptoms at all.

Nicky Woolf (17:43):
Do you have other kind of friends and colleagues in Moscow who had sort of similar experience to yours?

James Schumaker (17:51):
Yes, I do. I don't want to, you know, invade their privacy, but I've— I've had some friends who have died from some very strange diseases out of Moscow.

Nicky Woolf (18:08):
James worked at more embassies over the next few decades until he retired in 2008. The Moscow signal kind of faded to the back of his memory. Until summer 2017.

News clip (18:20):
There's a new theory about the mysterious and debilitating symptoms Reported by dozens of government— The most likely explanation: directed pulse microwave energy.

James Schumaker (18:31):
Reports started coming out that one of the prime suspects in Havana Syndrome was microwaves or directed energy. And all of a sudden I'd say, "Well, hmm, this is really interesting."

Nicky Woolf (18:44):
James had this growing sense of déjà vu. He recognized the frustration and worry from embassy officials. The slow and inept government response, the dissent in the medical community, skepticism in the press and in Washington.

James Schumaker (18:59):
The initial government response to both Moscow microwaves and Havana syndrome was the same. You know, it's an inconvenient problem. Nobody knows exactly what it is. We're not ever going to be able to solve it, so let's just sweep it under the rug. That's the bureaucratic impulse.

Nicky Woolf (19:22):
It's worth saying the technology being described here is different. The Moscow signal was about long exposure to low levels of radiation. No Frey effect, no sound. The scientific community is split on whether this exposure to microwaves even can be carcinogenic in this way. We'll likely never know for sure in this case. There were no long-term follow-up studies done on the Moscow embassy cohort. But what about the present day? Is Russia still in the business of doing this sort of thing? We'll get into that after the break. We're back.

News clip (20:16):
Now Russia is the leading suspect.

Robert Bartholomew (20:18):
A microwave attack by the Russians.

Mitchell Valdés-Sosa (20:20):
Everybody I've talked to in the U.S. suspects the Russians are behind these apparent attacks.

News clip (20:26):
This looks like the Russians. It sounds like the Russians. It seems like something they would do.

Nicky Woolf (20:31):
We've heard how the Soviet Union used microwaves in the '50s, in the '60s, the '70s, the '80s. And in fact, the question of Russia has been hanging over this entire series. They're the elephant in the room. The bogeyman. That's why we've come to Virginia Beach, where we started this episode. It's why we've come to meet Marc Polymeropoulos, the senior CIA officer who went to Russia in 2017. There, something happened to him.

Marc Polymeropoulos (21:04):
I woke up in the middle of the night. The room was spinning. I had a splitting headache. I had tinnitus, which is ringing in my ears. You know, I'd been in war zones for years. I'd been shot at many times, but this was pretty terrifying.

Nicky Woolf (21:18):
Marc had never experienced anything like this, like he was losing control of his brain.

Marc Polymeropoulos (21:23):
It was just— it was this incredible, kind of terrifying, disconcerting feeling, but something clearly had happened to me.

Nicky Woolf (21:30):
At first, he thought it was food poisoning, but the symptoms never eased up.

Marc Polymeropoulos (21:35):
Really, when I get home, the first couple of weeks and months after that is when the symptoms got really bad.

Nicky Woolf (21:40):
His vision was getting worse. He had headaches. Vertigo and nausea came and went.

Marc Polymeropoulos (21:45):
I think back to a trip I took where I had to take my son to a high school baseball tournament in Florida and, and how terrifying it was that I couldn't drive.

Nicky Woolf (21:55):
This is when Marc started a painful medical journey. First, he went to a head and neck specialist. They couldn't figure out what was wrong with him. He started calling in sick to work. It's only then he makes the connection to the news about what's happened in Havana. So he goes to the CIA and asks for the same test protocol they were now using for those patients.

Marc Polymeropoulos (22:19):
The problem is when I got back to the United States and I went to the CIA's Office of Medical Services, They had a, they had kind of a tough time in believing me.

Nicky Woolf (22:27):
The initial tests were inconclusive, but he was feeling worse and worse. The victims from Havana and elsewhere had been sent to top-tier facilities— Walter Reed, the National Intrepid Center of Excellence. Marc was denied a referral. After decades working for the CIA, he felt betrayed. To him, the agency he dedicated his life to now wasn't backing him up.

Marc Polymeropoulos (22:53):
I used all of my medical leave, all my vacation leave. I was begging the agency to provide me medical care, and they didn't. I could barely make it through the day.

Nicky Woolf (23:05):
So in April 2019, at the age of 50, Marc retired. He still had symptoms, but in terms of finding treatment, he was on his own. He was fed up. He'd now dealt with years of bureaucracy, red tape, and people not believing him. So he did something that CIA people just don't do. He went public.

News clip (23:30):
Our next guest believes he was among those to suffer such an attack while working at a Moscow hotel back in 2017. Marc Polymeropoulos joins us now. He's a Marc Polymeropoulos ran clandestine operations across Europe and Asia. Joining me now is one of those former officials pressuring Haspel, Marc Polymeropoulos, a recently retired—

Nicky Woolf (23:52):
Marc quickly became a regular on the Washington TV circuit. Usually, he was there to answer one central question: could Russia be the culprit for this whole thing? Are they the ones behind what happened to him and the Havana victims? Are they our perpetrators?

Marc Polymeropoulos (24:11):
With the friends that I have in the intelligence community who have been affected by this, you know, there's a significant number who were working on or who have worked on Russian operations. It's almost a brilliant weapon because the Russians are able to take intelligence officers who are working against them off the playing field, but they do it in a non-attributable fashion.

Nicky Woolf (24:32):
Marc became a figurehead for victims of what the government was now calling anomalous health incidents. A sort of public advocate, a spokesperson. CIA officers, FBI agents, and diplomats who saw him on TV often reach out to say they're going through something similar and don't know what to do about it. Marc tells us that when he meets someone who's going through this, he tries to prepare them for the fight ahead.

Marc Polymeropoulos (24:54):
You know, this is life-changing. There's kind of this process of accepting that you're not the same person. We wish we were shot because, you know, people don't believe us. For us, it's a silent injury.

Nicky Woolf (25:08):
We'll hear more of Marc's story in a later episode, but he told us for now that he wants 3 things. The first is accountability for the government's handling of cases like his. He's frustrated that they don't seem to take all this seriously. The second thing he wants is for all the victims to get treatment and have access to healthcare.

Marc Polymeropoulos (25:27):
And the last bucket that I'm constantly interested in is attribution. Who's doing this? I think this is an act of war on our personnel, and we have to figure out who did this.

Nicky Woolf (25:37):
Marc thinks all roads lead back to Russia. To him, this phenomenon smacks of yet another Soviet-style active measure, just like the microwaves beamed at the thing hiding in the Great Seal, or the Moscow signal, radiation bathing the embassy when James Schumaker was there. But what's been bothering me is, why would they do this? How would it be in their interests? Marc has a theory.

Marc Polymeropoulos (26:04):
Well, they've sown total complete chaos, and there's huge fights within the US government on whether this is real or not. You know, it's a pretty, pretty hideous injury. But look what Russia is doing, you know, whether it's assassinations overseas, whether it's war crimes in Ukraine. And I don't think you can make an argument that this is any different in terms of ethics and morality and what the Russians do already.

Nicky Woolf (26:27):
Russia loves to seed chaos. We know this. Anyone who watches the news knows this. If they wanted to intimidate American security personnel, well, it's been a tremendous success. But the evidence against them is still circumstantial. And some of it raises more questions for me. How does all this tie back to Havana? If it really is a sort of Russian active measure, how would they have pulled it off on the ground? Why Cuba specifically? There are still some basic parts of the story that I need to fill in. And I can't do that from a distance. We need to be in Cuba. But getting there is proving to be quite hard. For one, the Cuban government is not known for its bureaucratic efficiency. And we're a bunch of foreign journalists who want to look into a supposed attack on Cuban soil, a supposed attack for which they were immediately blamed by the US government. It's maybe not surprising that they're a bit cagey. So we pitch them pretty hard for permission. Back in Washington, Max gets us a meeting at the Cuban embassy for journalist visas. We couldn't record the meeting itself, so afterwards we compare notes. we've just come back from the Embassy of the Republic of Cuba in Washington, D.C., on 16th Street, where we met with the Deputy Chief of Mission. Really, really interesting conversation. One thing in particular at the embassy kind of blew my mind. The first thing that really struck me was there's bullet holes and like all across the front of the embassy. And he was saying that that was— it was a far-right extremist anti-Cuba, who, in the middle of the night, just opens fire with a what seems like a pretty high-powered rifle. I mean, some of the bullet holes went all the way inside on the back wall of the big grand kind of staircase. This isn't ancient history, by the way. This was in April 2020. A man walked up to the Cuban embassy on one of the busiest streets in Washington in the middle of the night and opened fire. Neither me nor Max had any idea this had happened. For both of us, it's a moment for a real change in perspective. And I was sitting there thinking, you know, we're looking into an alleged attack on the American Embassy in Havana, and there was a literal attack with a gun on the Cuban Embassy in Washington. That's— I mean, that's nuts, right? Up to this point, I've looked at Cuba as the scene of the crime, but it's also possible they're a victim here. You know, this has had real impact on the lives of the Cuban people in terms of scientific exchange, in terms of tourism revenue, in terms of trade. I hope he got the sense that that's the kind of story we want to tell, and I hope he talks to his colleagues back home, and hopefully we have a reasonable chance at being able to go. As it turns out, this conversation was just the start of a long, drawn-out negotiation. We sent letter after letter to senior Cuban officials, filed all the necessary forms in triplicate. When we got responses, they all sounded promising. But final permission seemed to remain just out of reach. Months went by. With our deadline coming up fast, we'd almost given up hope. But then, at the last possible moment, the decision comes down. We had a green light. We are in Miami International Airport and we're about to board a flight to Havana, Cuba.

Archive audio (30:29):
At this time I would like our flight attendants to please prepare for takeoff. Bienvenidos a La Habana. Salgones contentados. Mantengan los pasillos libres. Todo equipaje de mano.

Nicky Woolf (30:42):
Wait, are we ready to say it? Is it time to say it now?

Max Johnston (30:47):
I think it's time.

Nicky Woolf (30:48):
We are in Havana. We have arrived. Next time on The Sound.

Max Johnston (30:56):
There it is.

Nicky Woolf (30:59):
Yeah, where it all began.

Max Johnston (31:03):
You guys just heard— That is—

Nicky Woolf (31:08):
That's the sound. The Sound is a production of Project Brazen in partnership with PRX. You can follow the show on Apple, Spotify, wherever you get your podcasts to stay up to date on new episodes. Do leave us a rating and review. It really does help people find the show. Unlock bonus content and immersive ad-free listening by subscribing to Brazen+ on Apple Podcasts. Subscribing will get you access to premium audio quality and exclusive reporting, including extended interviews from the show. The Sound was produced by Goat Rodeo. The lead producer is Max Johnston. The show was reported and written by me, Nicky Woolf, and Max Johnston. Executive producers for Project Brazen are Bradley Hope, Tom Wright, and Nicholas Brennan. Senior producers for Goat Rodeo are Ian Enright and Megan Nadolski. Mixing and engineering by Rebecca Seidel. Original score by the fabulous Attacca Quartet. Additional music from Max Johnston, Ian Enright, Rebecca Seidel, and Blue Dot Sessions. Editorial and production assistants at Goat Rodeo from Isabelle Kerby-McGowan, Cara Schellen, Jay Venables, and Megan Nadolski. At Project Brazen, Mariangel Gonzales, Megan Dean, Susie Armitage, Francesca Gilardi Quadrio Curzio, Salber Lee, Lucy Woods, Siddhartha Mahanta, and Neha Wadekar. Our producer in Havana is Boris Krespa. Ryan Ho is series creative director. Cover art designed by Julien Pradier. Series video production by Javier Labrador, Andrija Klaric, Giulia Franchi, Emily Chao, and Nicholas Brennan.

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