Inside BCCI: The Bank of Crooks And Criminals
The Illuminator: Art, Conspiracy and Madness 23 Dec 2024 30 min 4,003 words
Bradley Hope (00:00):
I'm Bradley Hope, one of the executive producers of The Illuminator. I hope you've enjoyed listening to the series. It's been over a year in the making. We've spent countless hours poring over Mark Lombardi's drawings, talking to those in his inner circle, and researching the people and companies Mark was most interested in. As you might know from listening to the show, Mark Lombardi's drawings charted corruption and scandal. His most famous series of drawings was on the Bank of Credit and Commerce International, a globe-sprawling financial institution that was entirely corrupt. All through the '70s and '80s, BCCI gladly serviced notorious criminals, dishonest politicians, and secretive intelligence agencies. Osama bin Laden, Saddam Hussein, the Medellín Cartel, and of course the CIA all had bank accounts at the bank. Here's a clip from episode 3.
News clip (00:55):
More ripoffs. The savings and loan scandal could cost half a trillion dollars. But in Washington, the big question still is, who gets the blame? The blame. The Iran-Contra scandal transfixed Washington for most of 1987 and renewed a struggle as old as the republic between the president and Congress. Two of the biggest stories of the '80s and '90s. The savings and loans debacle, when 1,000 institutions collapsed in an implosion of reckless investments. And the Iran-Contra affair, a secret U.S. arms deal where White House officials traded missiles with Iran to free Americans held hostage in Lebanon. We will not rest until the cheats and the chisellers and the charlatans spend a large chunk of their lives behind the bars of a federal prison.
Ako Mitchell (01:48):
It's these stories that become the catalyst for all Mark's drawings.
Bradley Hope (01:54):
Before Tom and I started Project Brazen, we spent years working as reporters at the Wall Street Journal, and I can tell you every single financial journalist has heard of the BCCI story. It was a massive scandal, but strangely, it hasn't become a well-known part of history in the same way as Watergate or the 2001 collapse of Enron. We got to talk about the scale of the BCCI scandal a little bit in The Illuminator, but there wasn't enough time for us to follow all the threads. So in this bonus episode, you'll hear me talking to Larry Gurwin and Peter Truell, who authored False Profits: The Inside Story of BCCI, the World's Most Corrupt Financial Empire. Both were financial journalists when the BCCI scandal was at its peak and spent years reporting the story, Larry at The Economist and Time Magazine, and Peter at The Wall Street Journal and The New York Times. Welcome, Larry and Peter. I'm not sure who wants to start, but I wanted to just really think about this from a high level. You know, people like all of us who've devoted our lives to investigating things, this is like a household name for us, BCCI. The everyday person, probably this is a little bit faint in their memory, and I would just love it if one of you could just, explain the BCCI scandal or the bank itself from a very high level and why does it matter?
Larry Gurwin (03:13):
Okay. Well, I think it's important to keep in mind that it was several scandals in one. The BCCI scandal, it was a banking scandal. It was a fraud, but it involved many different types of crimes. One of the crimes was lying about their financial condition and about their ownership. And this fooled depositors into thinking that it was a solid bank owned by, an assortment of Middle Eastern sheiks. And, that was one category of crime. Another was money laundering. They laundered money for some of the most notorious people, including Abu Nidal, the Middle Eastern terrorist. And Manuel Noriega, the dictator of Panama, and Pablo Escobar, who's very well known now even to the younger generation because of the Netflix series. So that was the second category, the money laundering. And then they, they also bribed government officials around the world, including bank regulators And this was a way to protect themselves and to facilitate, crimes. And then a fourth area, and this is the one that I'm most familiar with, is they— their secret ownership and elite secret and illegal ownership of other banks. So for example, they secretly and illegally owned First American Bankshares, which was a holding company bank holding company in Washington, D.C., and with headquarters just a few blocks from the White House. I know most about that aspect of the scandal because I wrote a magazine article about it. And in fact, this relates to Mark Lombardi because he did a big chart showing the relationships between BCCI, First American, and others. BCCI was a vehicle for facilitating crime, you know, arms trading and, money laundering, fraud, etc. So it was several scandals rolled into one.
Bradley Hope (05:37):
And Peter, maybe you could expound on this a little bit too, but is, is this the story of a bank gone wrong? Like they, they started off with a legitimate purpose and then they, they took a left turn into criminality? Or was this a bank that was created with criminality in mind from the very beginning?
Peter Truell (05:56):
I think it was created with nefarious intent in the sense that the understanding that the BCCI management had of running an international bank was way, way different to that which was common in London and New York.
Bradley Hope (06:14):
And you would think that if you're a bank for crooks and criminals, as Mark Lombardi liked to refer to BCCI, and other people did as well. You would think it would actually be a pretty good business. There would be tons of money flowing in through from drugs and other criminal behavior. Why did this bank not succeed? Was it because of law enforcement, or was it because of this fraud element that you mentioned before, Larry?
Larry Gurwin (06:39):
Well, it was being looted, and also they had high overheads. They expanded all over the world and they had, you know, many, many offices, and they weren't taking in enough revenue to, to support that. But it was also being looted, through things like commodity trades that were designed in such a way that certain people would, would make a profit from the trades and others would, would lose. But a key element of the scandal was that they lied about their ownership and they lied about their profits. They had no profits. The bank was founded in 1972. It was shut down by regulators in 1991. So roughly two decades. And it came out when it was shut down that it had never made a profit throughout its two decades of existence. So I think people were siphoning money out of it. That would explain why why the bank was not profitable, although it pretended to be.
Bradley Hope (07:43):
Let's go back to the very beginning of BCCI, 1972, you said. What is the origin story of this bank, and, and, and how do we know that criminality was sort of embedded in the concept from the very beginning? And, and also, what was the inflection point when it went from a small bank to becoming this big bank?
Larry Gurwin (08:02):
Okay, well, the, the— I mean, the origin, Abedi, the founder, Agha Hassan Abedi, he was a Pakistani banker. He was an executive of a Pakistani bank. And then he launched this with backing from Sheikh Zayed, who was the ruler of Abu Dhabi and president of the United Arab Emirates. And he conceived of it as sort of a third world bank. And it would cater to people in third world countries. And the bank opened branches. I think it had the largest branch network in Africa of any foreign bank. And it was also in Latin America, Asia. It pioneered sort of what you could call ethnic banking. You know, because they were Pakistanis and the bank was supposedly owned by Arabs, customers of the bank who were from the Middle East or South Asia could feel that, oh, So this was a bank that understood them, that was culturally in tune with them. And so there was that legitimate side to the bank. You know, there were people who were, say, of Pakistani origin living in London. They could go to a bank and the personnel of the bank were from similar backgrounds. So, you know, they felt comfortable there. The bank also emphasized trade financing. If you were a business person in the UK and you were importing things from Nigeria, BCCI had a presence in both countries. So that was the one dimension to it. But at a very early stage, and I can't actually pinpoint the year, I don't really know when, it was clear that they were willing to break the law. And one of the ways that they broke the law was In countries where it was difficult for a foreign bank to operate, where you had to have a local partner who owned 51%, they would hire people to pretend to be the shareholder. So they did this in Nigeria, they did it in South America, where they would just recruit some local person who would pretend to be the majority owner. And then in, in, in the United States, they took over a bank in Georgia, National Bank of Georgia, and they used one of their clients, Gaith Faroon, a wealthy Saudi, to pretend to be the real owner. And then of course the biggest one was First American in Washington, D.C., where they recruited some sheikhs to pretend to be the owners of First American.
Bradley Hope (10:50):
That's fascinating.
Larry Gurwin (10:52):
And by the way, this relates to, since you're interested in Lombardi, you know, his, he had this wonderful chart of BCCI called BCCI FAB ICIC, where he was illustrating all the relationships of dummy companies and individuals of how, you know, how BCCI pulled this off.
Bradley Hope (11:17):
Did you come across his work when you were working on your book?
Larry Gurwin (11:21):
No, but afterwards there was a Wall Street Journal story about Lombardi, and that's the first time I heard of him. And I remember reading somewhere, it might have been in that journal article or somewhere else, that that was his primary— appeared to be his primary source for his BCCI charts. Was our book, which is of course very flattering.
Bradley Hope (11:47):
Yeah, definitely. It's really an amazing piece. We actually put it on our website. We actually licensed the picture so you can zoom in rather than just see the kind of blurry version. What about— so there's different types of criminals who are using it. Could you kind of talk about the different flavors of criminality at BCCI, either one of you? You know, we talk about the drug cartels, the terrorism financiers. Maybe you could just kind of explain about how they each used it.
Larry Gurwin (12:16):
Well, you had drug traffickers like Pablo Escobar who laundered money through BCCI. And in fact, there was a criminal case in the U.S. where a U.S. Customs agent operating undercover pretended to be a professional money launderer, and he approached the BCCI branch in Tampa, Florida, and he said quite openly that he was laundering drug money and they were happy to accept him. There was no hesitation. And I don't know, the reference is a bit old, but Lee Iacocca was a household name back in the '80s as the head of Chrysler. So the undercover agent would use this stock phrase with the BCCI bankers. He would say, what Lee Iacocca is to cars, my customers are to coke. So, there was no doubt at all that he was handling cocaine money. So, he did that. He also had political money. Noriega's personal banker was a BCCI representative in Panama. And then, as I said before, Abu Nidal. And mentioning Abu Nidal, the terrorist, sort of leads you on to the intelligence world because they have sort of a conflict of interest because the intelligence agencies want to be able to monitor what certain people are doing. And our understanding was that the American intelligence and British intelligence were kind of happy that Abu Nidal had accounts at BCCI because that enabled them to monitor what he was doing more easily. And, and I'm told that when BCCI was shut down, British intelligence, was involved. And when there were people who discovered hidden microphones at the BCCI headquarters in London, British intelligence intervened and said, you know, don't, don't bother about that, you know, we'll deal with the microphones. They presumably had planted them. Anyway, so that, and then they also laundered money for fraudsters. We discovered that some investment fraudsters, you know, like people running Ponzi schemes, had laundered money through BCCI.
Bradley Hope (14:51):
And obviously, there's some references to how the bin Laden family itself had some connection to BCCI. And in our podcast, we also talk about how the FBI showed up asking to see that picture that you mentioned before from Mark Lombardi soon after 9/11 to try to get some more clues or some leads on what's going on in a visual way. Could you talk about that a little bit?
Larry Gurwin (15:16):
It's a really treacherous area because On the one hand, there really are conspiracies. There really are crazy things that happen in the world, like Watergate or Iran-Contra. Things like that really did happen, you know. The CIA's, LSD experiments really happened. Their assassination plots really happened. But then on the other extreme, you have people who are sometimes mentally ill people who imagine conspiracies and can become paranoid. And when you're dealing with this kind of subject matter, it's, it's, it's, it can be very treacherous because you can get people who go to one extreme or another, people who will completely deny that anything was untoward, and people who can go to the other extreme and, and be, be, you know, paranoid.
Bradley Hope (16:10):
Yeah. Well, I suppose it's the six degrees of separation kind of effect where you could sometimes see a connection, but it's actually not a meaningful connection, right?
Larry Gurwin (16:22):
Absolutely. You know, people with a fertile imagination can come up with all sorts of crazy theories. But as I said before, it's a mistake to go to the opposite extreme and just say that, oh, these things never happened. there are a lot of things that seem crazy really did happen.
Bradley Hope (16:44):
Yeah, it makes sense. Peter, what do you think is the big takeaway for you from having worked on this book and looking at this scandal? I mean, how did it change the way you view the whole world? You know, do you find yourself not believing the mirage of things as much, or, you know, just feeling more skeptical about even everything in the global financial system?
Peter Truell (17:06):
I think skepticism is always warranted, but I do think that it underlines the importance of very able and thoughtful regulation. And this was not a properly regulated institution at all. I think we go into the, the way that the regulators got blindsided because it was basically— there were two holding companies, one in Luxembourg and one in the Cayman Islands, and there was meant to be some oversight from the Bank of England, but it wasn't really a properly registered UK Bank.
Larry Gurwin (17:36):
I think that's an excellent point. I heard a presentation once by one of the regulators who said that it made absolutely no sense for them to have two holding companies. And that's something that alone should have been a huge red flag to the regulators. And we discovered in our reporting that they deliberately set up this structure so that they could fool the regulators and like move bad loans back and forth to different entities. So there were a lot of things that were, in retrospect, were just really obvious red flags that were ignored by regulators.
Bradley Hope (18:16):
Well, what happened to BCCI after the regulators swooped in? Like, what happened to the Pakistani founder and all the other kind of key employees? Where are they in the world today?
Peter Truell (18:27):
Well, Abedi's dead. I mean, he passed away, and many of the senior members of the team have died. I think Swahili Nakwe did spend some time in, in detention, right, Larry?
Larry Gurwin (18:40):
Yes. Yeah, he's, he's, he's served some time in prison, I believe. I remember when he was, when he was first arrested, he was put in jail in Alexandria, Virginia, which was where I was living at the time. And I, I remembered every time I was on my way to and from work, I could see the jail where Nafi was being held. It was sort of funny. But, though, there are a lot of, yeah, a lot of people have passed away. Robert Altman, who was one of the key figures in the BCCI/First American relationship, he died a year or two ago. He was the husband of Lynda Carter, who played Wonder Woman in the 1970s.
Bradley Hope (19:23):
But, and I remember it was, I used to live in Abu Dhabi for a period of time. And there was still a BCCI liquidation office there, and it was still trying to kind of work through the ramifications of this case many years later.
Larry Gurwin (19:39):
Well, as I recall, the liquidators did a fantastic job in recovering money, partly through litigation. You know, they were suing people who were blamed for the loss, including Sheikh Zayed. And I think in the end of the day, the depositors got back most of their money. So they, you know, that was something of a happy ending.
Bradley Hope (20:08):
When you speak to people in your career, regulators, law enforcement, what role did this particular scandal have in their thinking about how to pursue investigations or how to prevent things like this from happening again? I mean, was this really the big case that was in people's minds, you know, during this period of time, the '90s and early 2000s?
Peter Truell (20:30):
Well, it was a, it was a huge case, and it certainly alerted the regulators to many of the deficiencies of, you know, poor and lax regulation.
Larry Gurwin (20:40):
But, you know, it— we have to be worried about the future. I mean, look, look at crypto. I'm, I'm not an expert on crypto, but it seems to me that It only serves two real purposes, you know, speculation or money laundering. I can't see a legitimate purpose for crypto. And during the recent US presidential campaign, you had crypto people who were giving huge donations to both Harris and Trump. And what did they want? Less regulation of crypto. It's obvious. so that, that's very scary. You see this all the time, that regulators being influenced by rich people.
Bradley Hope (21:26):
Yeah, you mentioned earlier that there's such a thing as a real conspiracy. You mentioned Iran-Contra and all these other ones. Based on everything you've done in your career and working on this book, what's the key to uncover the real conspiracies without falling for conspiracy theories? That go too far? I mean, how do you go about investigating things yourself?
Larry Gurwin (21:49):
Well, that's a tall order, but I think you have to, in a way, you know, play devil's advocate with yourself, although that's sort of kind of hard to achieve. But you have to think very critically about your evidence. You know, what do I know? How do I know it? I mean, as a— you're an investigative journalist and you know the process. Somebody tells you something and then you want to know what is their motive. And even if they have a selfish motive, it doesn't necessarily mean it's false. But you have to ask a lot of probing questions like, you know, well, you think this person is a crook. Why? What is your evidence? You know, I mean, when we were working on BCCI and First American, I was constantly trying to, we, I should say we, were constantly trying to get sources to corroborate things. Or, you know, a former BCCI employee would say something and we could sometimes get corroboration from a third party. But there are times when you just can't nail it down and you just have to leave it out even though it's very frustrating. Believe very strongly that something is true, but if you can't substantiate it, you have to leave it out.
Bradley Hope (23:09):
Yeah, I think you're pointing out something that's very important in the Mark Lombardi story too, because ultimately he was an artist and he was trying to depict the world, but he didn't have the additional skill set or focus on testing the connections, you know. So he was— he would see the connections and line them up, but not necessarily investigate them himself. So I think that's where, if you're really doing derivative work, that's where the risk is especially strong.
Larry Gurwin (23:37):
Well, you know, are you familiar with i2, this software to make link charts? It's very popular with cops and journalists and private investigators. And sometimes these charts look really compelling, and then you dig into it and you see that there's really just a pure coincidence, or it's— or there's an innocent explanation for a connection that seems to be, really relevant. So yeah, it's— it, it, it could be very challenging. Of course, you should have feedback from third parties, if you're a journalist, you know, your editors should be constantly challenging you, and colleagues and others.
Bradley Hope (24:26):
But I think this is an especially important point, though, for the consumers of news as well, because if they're looking at these alternative sources that are starting to proliferate, it's really important to understand, are they actually doing the work, or are they just making the connections based on these kind of coincidences? There's something about conspiracies that people kind of want to believe as well. They kind of want to believe there's a cabal of people controlling the world and you know, doing secret things behind the scenes, which is actually kind of true, but it's also not true.
Larry Gurwin (25:00):
Well, it's, it's a, it's, it's sort of mental laziness because people who do that, they're looking for a shortcut. For example, great example, since you're a journalist and Peter and I are former journalists, a lot of times people who have no knowledge of journalism, they will come up with a theory to explain why a particular article was given prominence, or why was it on page 1 instead of something else? And they come up with some elaborate conspiracy theory. Oh, because that promotes a company where the, you know, the editor's son is at the same private school as the daughter of the guy who runs that company. So clearly he's doing a favor for a friend. And then when you, if you really are inside the newspaper, they'll say, no, it's because There was some story that fell through and we needed a last-minute replacement, and that was the only one available, so they slapped it in. So, you know, often very banal, boring explanations are the real— are the true explanations.
Bradley Hope (26:08):
Yeah, definitely. Well, thank you both so much for coming and talking about BCCI, and I recommend everyone buy a copy of False Profits and get up to speed on all the details. And yeah, well, thank you for all your work as well on investigating this.
Larry Gurwin (26:25):
Well, thank you. Thanks for having us. Thanks for having us. We're happy to pass the torch to your generation.
Bradley Hope (26:33):
Thank you. I hope you enjoyed listening to our conversation. If you'd like to see Mark Lombardi's biggest BCCI drawing in full, you can do so on our website by going to brazen.fm/illuminator/bcci or clicking the link in the show notes. And if you like The Illuminator, I hope you'll consider leaving a review on your podcast app. It really helps get the word out to others. Thank you for listening to The Illuminator.
The audio is the record: this transcript may differ from it in small ways.
